Browsing by Author "Jayatilleke, J.A.D.F.M."

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Is there a methodology unique to western science?A Critical investigation from the philosophy of science
(University of Kelaniya, 2011) Jayatilleke, J.A.D.F.M.
In order to answer this question, we have to go back to post-renaissance Europe. There we come across two contemporary philosophers of science, namely, Francis Bacon (1561 – 1626) and Galileo Galili (1564 – 1642). Bacon advocated the method of induction as the method of science. Bacon belonged to the philosophical tradition called Empiricism, according to which sense experience is primary in gaining knowledge. As against this method of induction advocated by Bacon, his contemporary Galileo proposed the method of Hypothetico-Deduction. According to this method scientists should start with a hypothesis and then deductive reasoning could lead him to predictions. Galileo belonged to the philosophical tradition called Rationalism, according to which the mental faculty is primary in gaining knowledge. Even though Bacon belonged to the empirical tradition of philosophy, the strongest critique of Bacon‟s method of induction came form the most prominent Empiricists of all, namely David Hume(1711-1776). Despite these criticisms, the above mentioned two methodologies of Bacon and Galileo stood out prominently as answers to the question in the title during the whole period of three centuries, i.e. from 17th century to 19th century A.D. The next major intervention regarding the methodology of science occurred at the beginning of 20th century through a group of intellectuals called Vienna Circle. The Vienna Circle created a tradition (or school) of philosophy namely, Logical Positivism. Logical Positivists also advocated the method of induction as the method of science but it was a more sophisticated version of inductivism. Logical Positivism dominated the scene during the first half of the 20th century, but every tenet of Logical Positivism was demolished by the subsequent developments in the philosophy of science. The next important philosopher of science to emerge was Karl Popper (1902-1994). He advocated the method of falsification as the method of science. Popper‟s method of falsification too, encountered serious drawbacks. Later philosophers of science claimed that Popper‟s method of falsification was too simple and not justifiable in the actual practice of science. Thomas Kuhn, the American philosopher of science marked a turning point in the 20th century philosophy of science through his major work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). Kuhn did not advocate any method for science. He introduced a number of important concepts to the philosophy of science namely, paradigm, normal science, revolutions in science, and incommensurability. His contemporary Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994), a Switzerland born philosopher was more radical than Kuhn. Feyerabend in his classic, “Against Method” (1975) repudiates the very idea of a scientific method. Both on grounds of logic and history, he questions the belief that there is something called the method of science which distinguishes science from the other knowledge systems.
Relativism based on Buddhist epistemology
(Research Symposium 2010 - Faculty of Graduate Studies, University of Kelaniya, 2010) Jayatilleke, J.A.D.F.M.
The resurgence of relativism in Western philosophy occurred in the 1960’s through the works of the American philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn. Two important concepts introduced by Kuhn, namely ‘Paradigm’ and ‘Incommensurability’ led to the logical conclusion that theories have only relative validity. But Kuhn hesitated to be branded as a relativist. Kuhn was severely criticised by the contemporary scientists and philosophers for leading science, thereby knowledge, towards relativism. Very few contemporary philosophers of Kuhn, namely, Paul Feyerabend, Nelson Goodman, Joseph Margolis, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela openly defended relativism of knowledge. Most of the western philosophers and scientists could not accept relativism of knowledge because of their deep rooted belief that there is a world out there independent of us. In other words the majority of western philosophers and scientists believe in a reality independent of human beings. According to them, cognition is the representation of the world ‘out there’. Even some of the philosophers who reject this representational view of the world ‘out there’ do not accept relativism. They prefer to call them pragmatists. There are few philosophers and scientists who openly embrace relativism. Philosophers like Feyerabend, Goodman, Margolis and scientists like Maturana,Varela belong to this category. According to the two scientists (as well as philosophers ) Maturana and Varela, cognition is not a representation of the world ‘out there’ but rather an ongoing bringing forth of a world through the process of living itself. Both of them were colleagues at the University of Chile. Varela died in 2001.Maturana still works at the University of Chile. Both of them are Biologists who are specialised in Cognitive Science, and their theory is called the ‘Santiago Theory of Cognition’. They were largely influenced by the Buddhist philosophy. The Sri Lankan theoretical physicist cum philosopher Nalin de Silva has developed a relativism namely ‘Constructive Relativism’ which is based on Theravada Buddhist philosophy.According to him, knowledge is constructed relative to our five senses, mind and culture, due to ignorance (avidya). He has introduced the important concept ‘Chinthanaya’ which is broader and deeper than Kuhn’s ‘Paradigm’. For example a Chinthanaya could give rise to a number of paradigms. While Alopathy (Western Medicine) has been created in theJuda-Greek-Christian Chinthanaya, Ayurveda Medicine has been created in the Bharatha (Indian) Chinthanaya. Different Chinthanayas give rise to different knowledge systems.The hallmarks of Juda-Greek-Christian Chinthanaya are very high degree of abstractness, analysis, linearity, and reductionism. Whereas the hallmarks of Sinhala Buddhist Chinthanaya are concreteness, balance between analysis and synthesis, cyclicity and holism.