Introduction

Buddhism and Jainism come up in ancient India are known to be cardinal Sramanic traditions, which brought out teachings dissented to Brahmanism or Creationism contemporary existed and introduced atheistic doctrines that led to emancipation through the self-understanding. Undoubtedly, a number of identical teachings are perceptible in these two traditions. In a careful study, only point comes across, which made the difference between these two traditions, is the concept “anatta” which unique to Buddhism. In brief, the number of former leaders, the rules of the Oder, characters of the leaders, the explanations of “anicca” and “dukkha” are almost equal to the both these two traditions. (I have already published a few writings in this regard. Please refer the following information) This paper, particularly examines the similarities and dissimilarities between these two traditions referring the concept of “Kamma” found in the Upali-sutta of the MN. The discussion took place between the Buddha and Dighatapassi, who was one of the students of the Mahāvīra. Especially, this dialogue brings to light what the difference between the teachings of the Mahāvīra and the Buddha are prevailing.

As Dighatapassi stated, Mahāvīra introduced the term “danda” for the “kamma” discussed in the Buddhist teaching. However, numerically the “danda-s” was equal to the Buddhist “karma”; three. Namely, they are called bodily (kāya), verbally (vaci) and mentally ( mano) dandâ-s and kammâ-s. Nevertheless, Nātaputta gives the precedence to the body (kāya) danda while Buddhism believes that the mind is pivotal among three kammâ-s. In this circumstance, the question remains to be answered is whether Mahāvīra or Jainism rejects the mental-actions, and Buddhism rejects the bodily-actions. It should be carefully examined if, this viewpoint of the “danda” was a traditional Jain teaching or merely a teaching introduced by Mahāvīra. In this study, my special attention will be paid towards the Upali-sutta and the Uttarajjhaya-sūya and meantime additional references will also be discussed.

The discussion between Dighatapassi and the Buddha

At the beginning, it would be imperative reading well what the Upali-sutta originally says. [Followings are the quoted two paragraphs from translation of the Majjhima-nikāya by Bhikkhu Bodhi].

(1.) “Tapassi, how many kinds of action does the Nigantha Nataputta describe for the performance of evil action, for the perpetration of evil action?” “Friend Gotama, the Nigantha Nataputta is not accustomed to use the description ‘action, action’; the Nigantha Nataputta is accustomed to use the

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Then, Tapassi, how many kinds of rod does the Nigantha Nataputta describe for the performance of evil action, for the perpetration of evil action?” “Friend Gotama, the Nigantha Nataputta describes three kinds of rod for the performance of evil action, for the perpetration of evil action; that is, the bodily rod, the verbal rod, and the mental rod.” “How then, Tapassi, is the bodily rod one, the verbal rod another, and the mental rod still another?” “The bodily rod is one, friend Gotama, the verbal rod is another, and the mental rod is still another.” “Of these three kinds of rod, Tapassi, thus analyzed and distinguished, which kind of rod does the Nigantha Nataputta describe as the most reprehensible for the performance of evil action, for the perpetration of evil action: the bodily rod or the verbal rod or the mental rod?” “Of these three kinds of rods, friend Gotama, thus analyzed and distinguished, Nigantha Nataputta describes the bodily rod as the most reprehensible for the performance of evil action, for the perpetration of evil action, and not so much the verbal rod and the mental rod.” “Do you say the bodily rod, Tapassi?” “I say the bodily rod, friend Gotama.” “Do you say the bodily rod, Tapassi?” “I say the bodily rod, friend Gotama.” “Do you say the bodily rod, Tapassi?” “I say the bodily rod, friend Gotama.” Thus the Blessed One made the Nigantha Digha Tapassi maintains his statement up to the third time.

The above two paragraphs incorporate a few crucial spheres where our prudent analysis required. As I have examined, they are;

1. Two traditions use different terms ‘kamma’ and ‘danda’ for the immoral actions.
2. The both traditions numerically admit three actions (3)
3. Two traditions agreed that the three actions are functioning on an individual basis.
4. While Buddhism admits the mental-action to be the most culpable, Mahâvîra taught that the bodily-action is the most reprehensible
Consonant with the above facts, two contrasting points are found between these two traditions. As I noted in the footnote in advance, “danda” could not be rendered as “rod” at all in this context of immorality. Jacobi translates it as ‘committing by sin’. Monior Williams defines alternatively to be power of application and violence. Accordingly, I understand “danda” as “violence” since it should be explained with two subsequent words; evil actions and the existence of evil. The above analysis leads to raise a few possible sub-questions in relation to the research plan as (1) does Buddhism reject the bodily-actions? (2) does Jainism reject the mental-actions? (3) to what extent Buddhism affords priority to the mind in the context of the Upâli-sutta?

Buddhist teachings on the bodily-actions

Buddhism, introducing causality, affirms that the body and mind are interdependent. Explicitly, the Nalakalâpaka-sutta of the Samyutta-nikâya insists that the existence of an individual mind and body is impossible. Then, in which sense the Buddha said that the mental-actions are primordial? The dependable answer could be found at the end of the discussion in this writing. However, the verses found in the Dhammapada claim the similar viewpoint regarding what we are discussing. In this connection, the Dhammapada points out the advantage of restraining the bodily, verbally and mentally doors. It, further, claims that a monk, who restrains all three doors, is called as the Brâhmana. Under this circumstance, the teachings in the Upâli-sutta presents a critical teachings how the mind becomes more important in the context of immorality. Yet, a certain sutta of the Samyutta-nikâya, also asserts that the mind is leading the world. In this regard, a similar teaching could further be found even in the first verse of the Dhammapada. However, it does not mean that the Buddhism rejects the body/matter or bodily-actions at all. Obviously, the teaching in the Upâli-sutta should be understood in the moral sense. Morally, the bodily and verbal actions are functioning as a stimulation of the mind. In consequence, the mind corruption could be the most grievous than the bodily and verbal-actions. For instance, the wrong views, an outcome of the mental-actions, could lead for the whole bodily and verbal actions.

The connection between the volitions and the precedence of the actions

If the mind and body are interdependent, in which sense does Buddhism convince that the precedence should be given to the mind? In this regard, the Nibbedhika-pariyâya-suttais; the only reference that clearly states that the volitions (cetanâ) are leading the Kammâ-s. However, the Upâli also contains the same standing point in an indirect form where the discussion is continued with Upâli. The point that clearly should be understood herein is that the Upâli-sutta does not occur that the mind is leading to the Kamma-s, but, the volitions are leading all three kinds of the Kammas; kâya, citta and mano. Broadly speaking, the mental actions (mano-kamma) mean the functioning state of the mind (mano). In other words, mano and mano-kamma-s are two different concepts since the mental actions vary from the original form of the mind. The Upâli-sutta stresses on the mental-actions unless the mind. And, it further compares the gravity of the Kamma-s among the three. In understanding the real context of the Upâli-sutta, it is needed to observe what the mano-kammâs are. A notable aspect in this regard is that among the six senses, the mind comes in the sixth and it objects the Dhamma-s and depends on the mind-consciousness. Basically, the kammâs by the mind could be taken to be the
Dhamma-s. Peculiarly, a synonym for the Dhamma-, so in this context, it would be taken as the volitions. In this respect, the teaching of the Nibbédhiķa-pariñjāya-sutta also adaptable to understand the content of the Upāli-sutta because the term cetanā is a synonym for the Dhamma-s. Though the commentary of the Dhammapada is contrary to my current understanding, I do strongly believe that the term Dhamma comes in the first verse of the Dhammapada could be rendered to be volitions. However, the phrase “cetanāham bhikkhave kammam vadāmi” is usually misinterpreted and the kamma is distinguished as thoughts. How I understand this, is that the Buddha made such statement comparing other two kamma-s and emphasized that the cetanā or the mano-kanna is the culpable Kamma. Hence, the statement “cetanāham bhikkhave kammam vadāmi” should not be understood out of the comparative context. The other interesting question is how the mano-kamma-s or the cetanā becomes chief among these three. Especially, the volitions or the Dhamma-s are leading to uphold a wrong view, which is considered to be the most serious sinful kamma. According to the Anguttara-nikāya, the Buddha clearly says that the wrong view is the only severer dhamma (volitions?). Hence, the teaching of the Upali-sutta should be understood that the mano-kammas were defined to be the most gravity because it leads to the wrong views, the most sinful dhamma-s.

**How does the Sûtrakṛtânga respond to the Buddhist teachings?**

However the viewers who believed that the thoughts are leading the kamma-s (the Buddhists), are seriously criticized in the Sûtrakṛtânga-sûya. Nevertheless, the weakness of the Sûtrakṛtângais that it does not make any rational argument against the Buddhist doctrine unless brought out baseless critiques. My understanding is that the Sûtrakṛtânga-sûya could be considered as a later work than the Uttarajjhaya and in consequence, it has made opposed criticisms against the Buddhist teaching. Another interesting fact the above source demonstrated is presenting arguments made by later Buddhist schools. Therefore, our presumption that the source could be later is undoubtedly confirmed and a broad discussion is not required related to the doctrine in the Sûtrakṛtânga.

**Clues in the Uttarajjhaya**

For the facts come to light in the Uttarajjhaya, a view can be supported that Jainism also primarily tended to the mind among the three doors. As the text says that the ignorance of the Dhamma is interpreted as the cause of the Kamma (previous). In accordance with the above point, the point I pick out is that the Kamma is due to the bodily violence (kāya-danda) could be altered. The Uttarajjhaya furthermore attests stating that the sleeping place is upper or lower for a monk, who practices penance and steady mind, will not be affected. Nevertheless, whose mind is not steady, indeed, he will be affected. The above remark also affirms that Jainism has focused on the steady mind since their Kammās were caused by the mind. In addition to these, a metaphor comes in the 23rd chapter of the Uttarādhyayana, is clear evidence that Jains accommodate the mind in the first place. According to the discussion between Kesi and Gautama, the mind is defined to be a stubborn horse and Gautama claims that controlling the horse, the journey could be finished in the right path.

As discussed the above, the Upāli-sutta reveals that Jainism admits three type of violence and the similar fact can be found in the 24th chapter of the Uttarādhyayana, where explains the samitis thus;
“A zealous monk should prevent his mind from desires for the misfortune of somebody else, from thoughts on acts which cause misery to living beings, and from thoughts on acts which cause their destruction.”

“A zealous monk should prevent his speech from (expressing) desires, &c. (as in verse)”

“In standing, sitting, lying down, jumping, going, and in the use of his organs, a zealous monk should prevent his body from intimating obnoxious desires.”

The above three quotations prove that the Jain teachings also run parallel to Buddhism. Especially, the above three statements are similar to the contents of the verses of the Dhammapada.

However, the same text claims thus;

“By watchfulness of the mind he concentrates his thoughts; thereby he truly practises control. By watchfulness of speech he keeps free from prevarication; thereby he enables his mind to act properly. By watchfulness of the body he obtains Samvara; thereby he prevents sinful Åsravas.”

As to how the above verses have recorded, Jain agrees that the mind comes in the first place, but the way of practice is based on the restrain of the body that will lead to the Nibbâna. The 23rd chapter further attests that the mind leads to awake the ñâna. According to the discussion made herein, it can be said that Jainism clearly admitted the mind to be primordial in violence. Nonetheless, in practice, the body is given the priority since they believed that the bodily restrain lead to the purity of the mind. The above argument also asserts that they restrained their body to purify the mind.

Conclusion

After analyzing the facts discussed in the body of the paper, a few concluding remarks could be held out. Mainly, it can be stated that the Upali-sutta discusses on the mental-actions unless the mind. Consequently, understanding the mental kamma-s would be the point, which helps to untangle the knot why the mental-actions are taken the first place. The paper concludes that the reason could be, its leading to the wrong views. And, answering to the question how to justify the Buddhist view, it can be said that the Buddha might have metaphorically convinced “the Dhamma is superior to the Vinaya”. While the mano-kammas leading to the practice of the Dhamma, rest of two kammas direct to the Vinaya. The above point was concluded by referring to the commentary of the DN, which notes that the Vinaya means the training of the body and speech. The commentary does not occur any connection to the mind in the above context. Thus, it can be concluded that the Jains mainly followed Vinaya and the Buddha gave the priority to the Dhamma. Even the explanation of the Sûtrakrtânga and the commentary by Silánka proves that the Jains extremely inclined to the Vinaya. However, references drawn from the Uttarajjahaya attest that the early Jain teachings did not give priority to the body like how the Nâtaputta or the Sûtrakrtângastated. Uttarajjhaya contains ancient teachings of Jains and its view on the kamma is most agreeable to the Buddhist view.
References

1Vijitha Kumara, S. (2016). Jain Shade in Early Buddhism with reference to the Araka Sutta in the AEGuttara-Nikâya
Religious Pluralism in Buddhism. International Association for Asian Heritage, University of Kelaniya. / Vijitha
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2 The 56th sutta of the Majjhima-nikâya

3“Na kho, âvuso gotama, âcinnam niganthassa nâmapputta ‘kammam, kamma’nti paññapetum; ‘danam, danda’nti kho, âvuso gotama, âcinnam niganthassa nâmapputta paññapetu ‘nti. M I 371

4 It should be noted in advance that the teachings presented by Mahâvîra were not always fully agreed to the
original Jain teachings. As we have noticed, the Jain canonical texts are fertile even with the former leaders'
teachings. For instance, the Uttarajjhaya brings a discussion between Gautama, who was one of students of
Mahâvîra and Kesi, a follower of Pârûvanâtha.).See the 23rd chap. of the Uttarajjhaya.

5 I have made my own suggestions as the translation does not fit for me.

6 I do not think that the term ‘rod’ is suitable in this context. Though “Danda” generally can be translated into rod,
in this context it offers the meaning “violence” because “Dandâ” here comes in a negative sense related to
‘immorality’.

7 Bhikkhus Nyanamoli and Bodhi, Majjhima-nikâya, trans. 478-479

8 Jacobi, H. 244

9 Jacobi, H. Uttaradhyayana trans. 136

10 SED 467

11“Tîni kho, âvuso gotama, nigantho nâmapputo danâni paññapeti pâpassa kammassà pâpassa kammassà kiriyâva pâpassa
kammassà pâpappattiyâ, seyyathidam – kâyadanam, vâcîdanam, manodanda ‘nti. M I 371

12Seyyathäpi, âvuso, ñe vec alâkalañiyo ânâmamaññam nissâva ñimhheyum. Evameva kho, âvuso, nânarûpaññapaccayâ vînñhâmam; vînñhâmapatccayâ nâmaraññam; S II 114’

13Kâyena samvaro sâdhu, sâdhu vëcâya samvaro Manasâ samvaro sâdhu, sâdhu sabbattha samvaro
Sabbattha samvuto bhikkhu, sabbadukkhâ pamuccati. Dhp 361

14“Cittena niyati loko, cittena parikassati Cittassa ekadhassamass, sabbeva vasamangavû”’ti S I 39

15ManopubbaEgamâ dhammâ, manosemabhû manoymayâ Manasâ ce padumhena, bhâsati vâ karoti vâ Tato nam
dukkhamanveti, cakkamva vahato padam. Dhp 1

16Cetanâham, bhikkhave, kammam vadâmî. Cetayítvâ kammam karoti – kâyena vëcâya manasâ A III 415

17“Cetanam pana, gahapati, nigantho nâmapputo kismim paññapeti”’ti?“Manodadasmim, bhante”’ti. M I 376

18“Manokammanti, tapassi, vadâmî” M I 373/ “Cetanam pana, gahapati, nigantho nâmapputo kismim
paññapeti”’ti? “Manodâmasim, bhante”’ti M I 377/ so samaGo vâ brâhmino vâ iddhimâ cetovasippatto
ekena manoñapodasa bhassam kâtum. ibid

19“Manasâ dhammam viññhâyâ M III 216

20“Cetanâtî tisu dvâresu nibbattitacetanâva gahitâ. A-a V 69

21Dhammâti gunadesanâpariyattinissattanijjîvavasena cattâro dhammâ nâma Dhp-a 1 21

22A III 415

23“Nâham, bhikkhave, ânâm ekadhassampam samanupassâmi yena anuppannâ vâ akusalâ dhammâ uppajjantâ
uppâppanâ vâ akusalâ dhammâ bhiyobbhavâya veppulâyâ samvattantâ yathâyidam, bhikkhave, micchadhîmmhi. A I 30

24Sûrtrakritânga; 2:24-28

25Sûrtrakritânga; 2:29i

26Sûrtrakritânga; 1: 15-17

27 Uttar. 23;55-58

28 Jacobi, H. Uttaradhyayana trans. 136

29 Dhp 361

30 Jacobi, H. Uttaradhyayana trans. 170

31 Uttar; 29: 57

32Kâyikavâcasikajjhâcâranisedhanato cesa kâyam vëcâya vineti, tasmâ vividhanayattâ visesanayattâ
kâyavijjânam vinajyano ceva vinayo ti akkhotâ D-a I 17

33 Sûrtrakritânga & Commentary; samaya-uddesa 24-28